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THE CAMPAIGN TO RESTRICT THE RIGHT
TO RESPOND TO TERRORIST ATTACKS IN SELF-DEFENSE
UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE U.N. CHARTER AND WHAT THE
UNITED STATES CAN DO ABOUT IT
Gregory E. Maggs*
I. Introduction
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter preserves the right of nations
to use military force in self-defense. The article says:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security.1
This broad language would appear to allow nations to use military force
in self-defense in response to “armed attacks” by terrorists. The United
States has cited the article in explaining its use of force against terrorists,
including its counter-attacks on al-Qaeda in response to the *150 1998
bombings of its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania2 and the attacks of
September 11, 2001.3
*
Professor of Law, George W ashington University Law Scho ol. I pre sented this
essay at the Regent Journal of International Law’s Symposium entitled, The War
on Terrorism : Balancing C ivil Liberties and National Security, held on November
18, 200 5. I wo uld like to thank Professor Sean Murphy, Professor Peter M aggs, and
all the pa rticipants at the symposium for their insights a nd sug gestions.
1
U.N . Charter art. 51.
2
See Letter from Bill Richardson, Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations, to Danilo Turk, President, U.N . Security
Council, U.N. Do c S/1998/780 (Aug 20, 1998 ) (“In accordance with Article 51 of
the Charter of the United Nations, I wish, on behalf of my Government, to report
that the United States of America has exercised its right of self-defence in
responding to a series of armed attacks against United States embassies and United
States nationals.”).
3
See Letter from John D. Negropo nte, Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations, to the President of the S ecurity C ounc il,
U.N . Doc. S/20 01/9 46 (Oct. 7, 2001).

In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish,
on behalf of my Government, to report that the United States of America,
together with other States, has initiated actions in the exercise of its inherent
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A significant problem, however, has developed over the past twenty
years. In a series of resolutions and judicial decisions, as this essay will
show, organs of the United Nations have attempted to read into Article 51
four very significant and dangerous limitations on the use of military force
in self-defense. These limitations find no support in the language of Article
51, they do not accord with general principles of self-defense, and they are
inimical to efforts to end terrorism.
The United States needs to oppose limitations on the right of selfdefense preserved by Article 51, not only for its own safety but also to
further the most fundamental goals of the United Nations. As William
Howard Taft IV, the legal advisor to the U.S. State Department, has said:
“One of the central purposes of the U.N. Charter is to prevent states from
attacking other states, and a state is surely less likely to attack another state
when it credibly expects the use of force in response by the other state, or
the other state and its allies.”4 Unfortunately, the United States has only a
few tools at its disposal for preserving its legal right to act in self-defense.
The United States can use its veto power to prevent the Security Council
from condemning countries that properly use force in self-defense. It can
also use opportunities afforded by the U.N. Charter to express its interpretation of Article 51, thus establishing helpful precedent for future disputes.
*151 II. The Use of Force Against Terrorism
Before the mid-1980s, the United States already had experienced many
acts of international terrorism. In 1973, for example, Palestinian radicals
killed two U.S. embassy officials in Sudan.5 In 1976, Croatian nationals
hijacked a TWA flight and planted a bomb in Grand Central Station.6 In
right of individual and collective self-defence following the armed attacks
that were carried out against the United S tates on 11 S eptem ber 2 001 .
Id.

4

William H. Taft IV, International Law and the Use of Force, 36 GEO. J. Int’l
L. 65 9, 65 9 (2005 ).
5
TIM OT HY NAF TAL I, BLIND SPOT: THE SECRET HISTORY OF
AM ER ICA N C OU NT ER TE RROR ISM 68-7 1 (2005 ).
6
Id. at 96-97 .
Sad ly the New York bomb squad [was] not able to de tonate the bo mb safely, and
one policeman died. The FBI negotiated with the hijackers and agreed to let them
issue their statement as long as they promised to release the hostages unharmed. In
France, after a two-day ordeal, the incident ended peacefully. The hijackers
surrendered and were extradited to the United S tates.
Id.
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1979, Iranian militants took over the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held the
staff hostage for a year.7 In 1983, a suicide bomber destroyed the U.S.
Marine barracks in Lebanon, killing over 200 persons.8
These were all horrible events. Yet the United States’ response to these
attacks was quite limited. Despite having the greatest military power in the
world, the United States did not react with armed force to these or any other
incidents of terrorism.9 Instead, the United States responded using only
diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and criminal law enforcement
measures. True, the United States did attempt a military rescue of the
hostages in Iran.10 However, it never undertook a counter-strike against the
hostage takers.
Seeing the ineffectiveness of previous responses, President Reagan gave
counter-terrorism efforts a new dimension in 1986. In April of that year,
terrorists sponsored by Libya bombed a nightclub in Berlin, Germany. 11
The explosion killed three people and injured 200 others.12 The casualties
included U.S. service members stationed in Germany, whom the terrorists
were targeting. Later that month, the United States struck back by bombing
Libya’s terrorist training camps, military *152 headquarters, and the
residence of Libya’s dictator, Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi.13
The assault on Libya was the first overt use of military force by the
United States in response to terrorism. 14 It was by no means the United
States’ last. Since 1986, although the United States government has
continued to prosecute some terrorists criminally, 15 it has used military

7

See DA VID FARBER, TAKEN HOSTAGE: THE IRAN HO STA GE C RISIS
AND AM ERIC A’S FIRST ENCOU NTER WITH RADICAL ISLAM 12-13
(2004).
8
See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM 201-03
(1990).
9
See N AFT ALI, supra note 5 , at 71-7 2; 96 -97; 114; 1 34.
10
See id . at 114 .
11
See M ary Williams Walsh, Germany Finally to Try ‘86 Disco Bombing Case,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at A1 (summarizing the evidence that German
prosecuto rs even tually gathered).
12
See id .
13
See Walter J. Boyne, El Dorado Canyon, 82 AIR FORCE MA GAZ INE 56
(M ar. 19 99).
14
See N AFT ALI, supra note 5 , at 185 .
15
See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004)
(prosecuting of defendant accu sed o f particip ating in the conspiracy to commit the
attacks of September 11, 2001); United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.

4
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force in response to several more incidents. Following the 1998 bombing
of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States fired
missiles at targets in Afghanistan and Sudan.16 After the bombing of the
U.S.S. Cole in 2000, the United States used an unmanned Predator aircraft
to strike and kill some of the suspected perpetrators as they were driving a
car in Yemen.17 And the horrendous attacks of September 11, 2001
prompted a massive and sustained use of military force in Afghanistan.18
III. The United Nations Charter
As the United States has used military force in response to terrorism, an
important reality has become clear: The application of this force almost
always takes place in foreign countries. The terrorists who attack Americans are generally foreigners. They tend to strike Americans in foreign
countries, flee to foreign countries, and have support in foreign countries.
The United States’ necessary resort to using military force in foreign
countries inevitably raises questions under the U.N. Charter. Part of this
multilateral treaty strives to curtail international warfare. Arti*153 cle 2(4)
says: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state .”19 Through this article, the nations signing the U.N.
Charter generally have agreed not to use military force outside their own
borders.
But despite the general prohibition against the use of force in Article
2(4), nations may use force abroad in three situations. First, members of the
United Nations may use force in foreign countries if those countries
consent. For example, for several years, the United States has had special

1999) (prosecuting of 10 defendants accused o f consp iring commit terrorists acts
in New York and elsewhere ).
16
See Letter from Bill Richardson to Danilo Turk, supra note 2 (providing the
official U .S. justificatio n for the strikes on Afghanistan and the Sudan).
17
See Letter from Jeffrey De Laurentis, Chief of Section, Political and
Specialized Agencies, P erma nent M ission of the United States to the United
Nations, at Geneva addressed to the secretariat of the Commission on Human
Rights, E/CN.4/2003/G/80 (Apr. 22, 2003) (expressing the official U.S. justification
for the strike in Yemen).
18
For a complete description of the military responses to the attacks of
September 11, 2001, see U.S. Dep’t of Defense, News about the War on Terrorism,
http://www .defendam erica.m il.
19
U.N . Charter art. 2, para. 4.
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forces assisting the government of the Philippines in fighting terrorists.20
These forces are in the Philippines by consent and thus are not violating
Article 2(4). Similarly, when the United States attacked members of
al-Qaeda in Yemen in response to the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000,
the United States was acting with the consent of the Yemeni government.21
But, of course, consent is not always possible. The leaders of al-Qaeda
and the Taliban clearly did not welcome United States forces into
Afghanistan after the attacks of September 11. Libya did not invite
American bombers after the Berlin nightclub bombing. Similarly, Sudan
did not request the missile strike that occurred after the embassy bombings
in Africa.
Second, Article 42 of the U.N. Charter says that nations can use force
outside of its territory if the Security Council authorizes the use of force.22
However, this provision, as a practical matter, does not offer much help to
nations that wish to combat international terrorism. A sad reality is that the
United States cannot count on the Security Council to authorize the use of
force against even the worst terrorists. In *154 fact, the Security Council
has never used Article 42 to authorize force against terrorists,23 not even
after the attacks of September 11, 2001.24

20

U.S. Pacific Command, Co mbating Terrorism in the Philippines, http://www.
pacom.m il/piupd ates/index.shtm l.
21
See Norman G. Printer, Jr., The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors under
International Law: An Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in Yemen, 8 UCLA J.
Int’l L. & FORE IGN AFF . 331 , 336 n.21 (2003).
22
See U .N. C harter a rt. 42.
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security. Such action may include demo nstrations, blockade, and other
ope rations by air, sea , or land forces of M emb ers of the United N ations.
Id.
23
See Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Shifting Boundaries of the Right of Self-DefenceAppraising the Impact of the September 11 Attacks on Jus ad Bellum, 36 Int’l L.
108 1, 10 90 (200 2).
24
One critic has argued that the U nited S tates itself pre vented the Security
Council from authorizing the use of force against al-Qaeda under article 42. See
Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, 53 Int’l & COM P. L.Q. 537
(2004) (“[W ]hilst the United N ations was prepared to authorise military action by
the United States and its allies in Afghanistan, the United States was not looking for
such authorization. It was seeking to a ct freely by invoking its inhere nt right of

6
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Therefore, that leaves just the third alternative: Article 51 of the U.N.
charter. Article 51 recognizes the possibility of using force in self-defense
when the Security Council has not acted. As noted at the start of this essay,
Article 51 recognizes the “inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations.”25 As a practical matter, it is only this provision-Article 51-that
the United States and other nations can cite to justify military action against
terrorists in a foreign country without the country’s consent.
In fact, the United States has relied on Article 51 to support military
actions that it has taken against terrorists in hostile countries. Article 51’s
second sentence requires a nation acting in self-defense to inform the
security council of what it is doing.26 The United States has complied with
this provision by writing letters to the president of the Security Council
when it has used force.27 For example, when the United States fired
missiles at Sudan and Afghanistan after the 1998 embassy bombings in
Africa, the Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations wrote
a letter to the President of the Security Council saying: “In accordance with
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish, on behalf of my
Government, to report that the United States of America has exercised its
right of self-defence in responding to a series of armed attacks against
United States embassies and United States nationals.”28
*155 IV. The Campaign to Limit the Right of Self-Defense
An unfortunate situation has developed since the United States began
to use force against terrorists. The problem is that organs of the United
Nations, such as the Security Council and the International Court of Justice,
have creatively interpreted Article 51 to contain four restrictions on the use
of force in self-defense. They have said Article 51 means that a nation
cannot act in self-defense in response to an armed attack unless the armed
attack is against the nation’s territory as opposed to it citizens or vessels.29
They have said that Article 51 does not permit a nation to respond to an
self-defence pursuant to A rticle 51 of the Charter.”). But little evidenc e substantiates this view.
25
U.N . Charter art. 51.
26
Id. (“Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the Security Counc il .”).
27
See, e.g., Letter from Bill Richardson to Danilo Turk, supra note 2; Letter
from John D. N egropon te to the President of the Security Cou ncil, U.N., sup ra note
3.
28
Letter fro m B ill Richardson to D anilo T urk, sup ra note 2.
29
See infra part IV.A .
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armed attack unless the attack had a traditional military character and
caused a significant amount of harm.30 They have ruled that Article 51
means that a nation can use military force in self-defense only after it has
clear proof of the identity of the perpetrator of the armed attack. 31 Finally,
they have asserted that a nation may act in self-defense only against nations
that engage in terrorism, and not against non-governmental terrorist
organizations.32 The following discussion describes these four creative
restrictions that the United Nations have attempted to impose.33 It explains
why these restrictions would stand as an obstacle to the war on terror.
Moreover, it demonstrates the reasons that they are legally unsound.
A. The Attempt to Impose a Territorial Limitation
In 1985, terrorists killed three Israelis on a yacht in Cyprus.34 Israel
suspected that agents of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) had
carried out the attacks.35 In response, Israel bombed the PLO headquarters
in Tunisia.36 Israel proclaimed that it was acting in self-defense to prevent
future attacks. The Security Council did not see it that way. The Security
Council, with the United States abstaining, condemned Israel for its “act of
armed aggression against Tunisian *156 territory” made “in flagrant
violation” of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.37
At the time, everyone could see that Israel was acting in self-defense
and that it wanted to prevent the PLO from striking again. Surely no one
thought that Israel had initiated armed aggression against Tunisia with
hopes of undermining Tunisia’s “territorial integrity or political independence”38 in violation of Article 2(4). So why wouldn’t Article 51 authorize
Israel’s response? The Security Council resolution contains no legal
analysis and therefore does not explain why the Security Council thought
Article 51 was not applicable. But the answer was apparent to observers:
The Security Council did not believe that Israel could act in self-defense to
an “armed attack” under Article 51 because the armed attack occurred in
30

See infra part IV.B .
See infra part IV.C .
32
See infra part IV.D .
33
For discussion of two possible additional restrictions, see infra notes 49 and
31

76.

34

See Associated Press, Israel Calls Bombing a Warning to Terrorists, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2 , 198 5, at A8.
35
See id .
36
See id .
37
S.C. R es. 57 3, P 7, U.N. D oc. 5/RES/57 3 (O ct. 4, 19 85).
38
Id. at P 4.
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Cyprus rather than in Israel. As Jochen Frowein put it, the Security Council
believed that “an armed attack cannot consist of a terrorist action against
citizens on foreign territory.”39 The Security Council, in other words, must
have interpreted Article 51 to mean that the “armed attack” must occur
against the territory of the nation wishing to exercise self-defense, not
merely against its citizens.40
The General Assembly apparently had the same view of Article 51 the
following year. In 1986, the General Assembly condemned the United
States for bombing Libya in response to the attack on the Berlin nightclub.
41
Like the Security Council, the General Assembly did not explain why
Article 51 did not preserve the right of the United *157 States to take this
action in self-defense. But again, no mystery surrounded the General
Assembly’s thinking. Observers recognized that the General Assembly was
interpreting Article 51 to mean that a nation may not use self-defense in
response to an “armed attack” unless the attack occurred against the
territory of the nation.42
The International Court of Justice also adopted this reading of Article
51 in its decision in the Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic

39

See Jochen Ab r. Frowein, The Present State of Research Carried Out by the
English-Speaking Section of the Centre for Studies and Research, in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRO RISM 64 (1988). See also Jackson
Nyamuya Maogoto, Countering Terrorism: From Wigged Judges to Helmeted
Soldiers- Legal Perspectives on America’s Counter-terrorism Responses, 6 SAN
DIEGO Int’l L.J. 24 3, 26 6-67 (2005) (discussing differing views on the issue
whether attacks on citizens of a nation outside its territory may constitute an “armed
attack” on the nation).
40
The Sec urity Co uncil also may have found article 51 ina pplicable b ecause it
believed that Israel lacked proof of the PLO’s culpability and because Israel was
retaliating instead of acting in self-defense. See Wallace F. Warriner, The Unilateral
Use of Coercion under International Law: A Legal Analysis of the United States
Raid on Libya on April 14, 1986, 37 N AV AL L. R EV . 49 (19 88). N either of these
argum ents seems much better. As part IV .C. explains, principles o f self-defense do
not require a victim to have proof of the identity of the perpetrator before taking
actions in self-defense. And article 51 specifically contem plates that nations will use
military force in response to an armed attack; calling the counterstrike “retaliation”
cannot negate Israel’s purp ose o f trying prevent future attacks by the P LO .
41
See G .A. Re s. 41/3 8, P 11, U .N. D oc. A /RES/41 /38 (N ov. 20, 19 86).
42
See John A. Cohan, The B ush Doctrine and the Emerging Norm of Anticipatory Self-defense in Customary International Law, 15 PACE Int’l L. REV. 283, 323
(2003) (noting that critics asked how “an ‘armed attack’ [could] exist in the isolated
murd er of A merican serv icemen ab road ”).
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of Iran v. U. S.).43 In the late 1980s, Iran was threatening oil shipments in
the Persian Gulf. The U.S. Navy went to the region to protect U.S.-flagged
vessels and to keep the peace. The Iranians then began laying mines in
international waters and firing on U.S. aircraft.44 At one point, a missile
came from the direction of two Iranian oil platforms in the Gulf and struck
a U.S.-flagged vessel.45 The United States responded by sending Navy
ships to destroy the platforms.46
Iran later sued the United States in the International Court of Justice.
The United States’ defended on grounds that it was acting in self-defense
under Article 51.47 But the International Court of Justice rejected the
defense on several grounds. Most relevant here, the Court said:
On the hypothesis that all the incidents complained of are to be
attributed to Iran the question is whether that attack, either in itself
or in combination with the rest of the “series of attacks” cited by the
United States can be categorized as an “armed attack” on the United
States justifying self-defence. The Court notes first that the Sea Isle
City was in Kuwaiti waters at the time of the attack on it, and that a
Silkworm missile fired from (it is alleged) more than 100 km away
could not have been aimed at the specific vessel, but simply
programmed to hit some target in Kuwaiti waters. Secondly, the
Texaco Caribbean, whatever its ownership, was not flying a United
*158 States flag, so that an attack on the vessel is not in itself to be
equated with an attack on that State.48
In this passage, the court concludes (1) that an attack against a
U.S.-flagged ship is not an armed attack if it occurs in foreign waters (e.g.,
the waters of Kuwait) and (2) that attacks on U.S.-owned property are not
attacks on the United States.49 The court thus appears to believe that armed
43

Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U. S.), 2003 I.C.J.
161 (No v. 6) [hereinafter Oil P latforms].
44
See id . at 175 .
45
See id . at 185 .
46
See id .
47
Id.
48
Id. at 191.
49
The quo ted paragraph also ap pears to state another restriction on the use of
force: A nation that has been subjected to an armed attack canno t respo nd unless it
was clearly targeted and not an unintend ed victim. See Natalia Ochoa-Ruiz &
Esther Salamanca-Aguado, Exploring the Limits of International Law Relating to
the Use of Force in Self-Defence, 16 E UR . J. Int’l L. 49 9, 51 4 (2005 ). This
restriction also has no legal basis. Nothing in the text of article 51 says that a victim

10
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attacks must occur against the sovereign territory of a nation before the
nation can exercise the right of self-defense under Article 51.
Although the Security Council, General Assembly, and International
Court of Justice all have interpreted Article 51 to permit nations to act in
self-defense only when an “armed attack” occurs against the nation’s
territory, this interpretation finds no support in the language of Article 51.
Article 51 identifies an “armed attack” as an event that would trigger a right
to act in self-defense. But it does not say that the armed attack must occur
against the territory of the nation. Indeed, it is instructive to compare
Article 51 to Article 2(4). Article 2(4) specifically addresses action taken
against “territory,” while Article 51 does not. So a reasonable interpretation
is that Article 51 does not impose a requirement that an armed attack must
be against a nation’s territory before the nation can respond in self-defense.
The General Assembly, Security Council, and International Court of
Justice’s creative but erroneous interpretation of Article 51 also is inimical
to the United States’ efforts in combating terrorism. Most international
terrorist strikes against the United States occur outside of its territory.
Accordingly, if Article 51 contains a territorial limitation, the United States
effectively cannot use military force in response to terrorism; as explained
above,50 the United States generally cannot act *159 without the consent
of the nation hosting the terrorists or without the express approval of the
Security Council.
This is a serious problem. If the United States cannot use military
responses against terrorists located in foreign countries, the only remaining
option is diplomacy. But diplomacy works between governments, which
represent constituents and have long term interests. Groups like al-Qaeda
do not participate in it; and they certainly are not deterred by the prospect
of diplomatic overtures.
B. The Attempt to Impose a “Grave Harm” Limitation
In addition to attempting to impose a territorial limitation, the International Court of Justice also has attempted to engraft a “grave harm”
limitation onto Article 51. This limitation would prevent a nation from

may respond in self-defense to an armed attack only if the perpetrator of the armed
attack had a specific mens rea. And a restriction of that kind would make little sense
as a matter of policy. If terrorist missiles are striking American vessels, the United
States should have the right to stop them, regardless of whether the perpetrators are
specifically targeting the Am erican vessels.
50
See su pra p art III.
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responding in self-defense to any armed attack unless that attack has caused
significant harm.
A requirement of “grave harm” first appeared in the Case Concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
v. U. S.),51 which came before the International Court of Justice in 1986.
Although this case did not involve terrorism, it did involve Article 51. The
communist Sandanista government of Nicaragua was supplying rebels in
El Salvador with arms to help them destabilize the government.52 In
addition, Nicaraguans had made cross-border incursions into Costa Rica
and Honduras. 53 The United States came to the aid of El Salvador, Costa
Rica, and Honduras by mining Managua’s harbor and taking other military
actions.54
Nicaragua sued the United States in the International Court of Justice,
claiming that the United States’ use of force was unlawful.55 The United
States said it was acting in the collective self-defense of its allies,
Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador, under Article 51.56 But the court
did not accept the argument. Article 51 did not permit the United States to
defend El Salvador because Nicaragua had supplied *160 only “an
intermittent flow of arms,” not on a “scale of any significance.”57 In
addition, the court ruled that the trans-border incursions by Nicaragua into
Honduras did not justify acting in self-defense because Honduras and Costa
Rica had not explained the facts of the incursion or why they considered
themselves victimized by them. 58 In other words, even if a nation is the
subject of an armed attack, it cannot use military force in self-defense
unless the armed attack caused substantial harm.59
51

Case Concerning M ilitary and P aramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U. S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
52
See id . at 119 .
53
See id . at 119 -20.
54
See id . at 118 .
55
See id. Nicaragu a argued that the United States’ action violated U.N. Charter
article 2(4) and principles of customary international law. But the International
Court of Justice based its decision solely on principles of customary international
law. Id.
56
See id . at 119 .
57
Id.
58
See id . at 119 -20.
59
See S ean D . Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed A ttack” in
Article 51 o f the U.N. C harter, 43 HARV. Int’l L.J. 41, 45 (200 2) (“If the
Nicaragua Court’s dec ision still stand s, then in an analysis under Article 51, one
must consider the scale of actions that might constitute an arm ed attack.”); W .
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The court reiterated and amplified this creative limitation on the right
to use force in self-defense in the Oil Platforms Case. In addition to
asserting the territorial limitation described above, the court said:
Even taken cumulatively these incidents do not seem to the Court to
constitute an armed attack on the United States, of the kind that the Court,
in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua, qualified as a “most grave” form of the use of force ....60 I n
other words, even though Iran may have sunk a ship and fired on other
vessels, it had not caused enough harm to warrant an action in response.
The magnitude limitation, like the territorial limitation, is inimical to the
war on terrorism. A threat may exist-and may require a response-even if an
armed attack fails to cause significant harm. To see this point, suppose that
on September 11, 2001, the same al-Qaeda hijackers had attempted to take
over and crash the same aircraft, but through some miracle, they failed in
their mission because passengers and the airline crews immediately had
subdued them. In that case, the United States still would have suffered an
armed attack, but the magnitude of harm actually caused by the attack
would be minuscule.
*161 Under the facts of this hypothetical and the International Court of
Justice’s restrictive view of Article 51, the United States could not respond
by using military force against al-Qaeda. This conclusion is not sensible.
The future threat posed by al-Qaeda would be no less, whether by
happenstance the nineteen hijackers had succeeded or failed. Furthermore,
the United States would have just as much reason to go to Afghanistan and
other foreign countries to eradicate the threat that al-Qaeda posed.61

Michael Reism an, International Legal Responses to Terrorism , 22 H OU S. J. Int’l.
L. 3, 37 (1999) (“The court’s approach to a right of unilateral response would seem
to depend on the amount of destruction wro ught: if a terrorist attack, whateve r its
intention, succeeded in killing only two peop le, it would not warrant unilateral
respo nse, bu t if it killed thousands, whatever its intention, it would.”).
60
Oil Platforms, supra note 4 3, at 19 1.
61
As one writer has elaborated:
The only way to prevent future acts of terrorism is to eliminate the support
without which terrorists canno t act: the financial support, the training bases, the
safe houses. Every state, every group that provides such support must be put on
notice to stop, and that if it does not, we will use whatever force is necessary to
do so. T his is not retaliation o r anticipatory self-defense . There is a continuing
imminent threa t to the U nited S tates.
Malvina Halberstam, T he U .S. Right to Use Force in Response to the Attacks on
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The International Court of Justice’s interpretation of Article 51-that only
armed attacks that cause significant harm permit military responses-finds
no support in the text of Article 51. Indeed, it is contrary to the article’s
basic purpose. Article 51 is a provision about self-defense, not about
revenge. It is a provision about preventing future harm, not about evening
the score. The goal is not to ensure that the victim’s response matches the
terrorist’s act but instead to ensure that the victim can take steps to prevent
future attacks that may occur.
By way of comparison, consider how the criminal law addresses
self-defense. 62 The Model Penal Code says: “[T]he use of force upon or
toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force
is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the
use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.”63 The
same general principle should apply under Article 51: A nation may use
force when it reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary
to protect itself from unlawful force by terrorists. In other words, the
question should not be how many service members did Libya actually
succeed in killing in Berlin or did al-Qaeda manage to kill on September
11, 2001. The question should be whether the United States, having seen
what happened in these attacks, believes that military force is necessary to
stop future threats. Armed *162 attacks by terrorists may demonstrate the
existence of a threat, regardless of the magnitude of injury that they
actually cause. In some instances, ordinary law enforcement methods-extradition requests and so forth-simply will not be enough even if
substantial harm has not already occurred.64
C. The Attempt to Require Clear Proof of the Perpetrator

the Pentagon and the W orld Trade C enter, 11 CARDOZO J. Int’l & COMP. L. 851,
861 -62 (2 004 ).
62
See John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (2004). “Article 51
copies the domestic system’s rule of self-defense in cases in which the government
cannot bring its pow er to bear to prevent illegal violence.” Id. at 738 .
63
Model Penal Co de § 3.04 (2001).
64
W hat if American terrorists struck targets in a foreign co untry? Could the
foreign country attack the United States in self-defense under article 51? T he
foreign country most likely would not need to take military action because the
United States (unlike Libya, Iran, or other terror-sponsoring nations) surely would
take immediate action against the terrorists. But if the United States for some reason
did not act, then a foreign nation could and should use m ilitary force in self-defense
unde r article 5 1.
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In the Oil Platforms Case, as described above, the United States
retaliated against Iran after a missile struck a U.S.-flagged vessel in
Kuwaiti waters. The International Court of Justice, as noted, rejected the
United States’ argument that it was acting in self-defense in part because
the attack was not against the territory of the United States and in part,
because it did not cause great harm.65 The International Court of Justice
also gave a third reason, namely, that the United States did not have
sufficient proof that Iran had fired the missile. The court said:
For present purposes, the Court has simply to determine whether the
United States has demonstrated that it was the victim of an “armed attack”
by Iran such as to justify it using armed force in self-defence; and the
burden of proof of the facts showing the existence of such an attack rests
on the United States [I]f at the end of the day the evidence available is
insufficient to establish that the missile was fired by Iran, then the
necessary burden of proof has not been discharged by the United States.66
The court then made the task of proof very difficult, if not impossible.
The United States presented satellite photographs and expert testimony that
Iran possessed missile-firing equipment at the oil platforms but the court
did not find the photographs “sufficiently clear.”67 The United States
presented eyewitness testimony of a Kuwaiti military officer who claimed
to have seen the missile and observed its direction*163 of flight, but the
court was not persuaded that he was credible.68 The court emphasized that
the United States had not shown that the missile that struck the Sea Isle
City had sufficient range to have come from the oil platforms because the
United States had “no direct evidence at all of the type of missile that
struck the Sea Isle City.”69 (The court did not say where the United States
could have acquired this evidence; indeed, this would probably be
impossible without the cooperation of the perpetrator given that the missile
would have disintegrated upon exploding.) The United States pointed out
that the President of Iran had threatened U.S. shipping in prior months,
saying that “Iran would attack the United States if it did not ‘leave the
region.”’70 But the Court did not think that was sufficient. The United
States showed that independent experts-“Lloyd’s Maritime Information
Service, the General Council of British Shipping, Jane’s Intelligence

65

See su pra p arts IV .A. & IV.B .
Oil Platforms, supra note 4 3, at 18 9.
67
Id.
68
See id .
69
Id. at 190.
70
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
66
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Review and other authoritative public sources”71 -all had blamed Iran for
the attack, but the court did not know what evidence these sources had
relied on and therefore thought that they might be wrong.
From this case comes the principle that a nation cannot defend itself
under Article 51 unless, and until, it has some high degree of proof of the
identity of the perpetrator. This second restriction, like the first, has terrible
practical effects. It is likewise wrong as a legal matter.
The practical consequences of this restriction are easy to see. How is a
nation supposed to come up with clear proof? Iran certainly did not
photograph the firing of the missile or admit responsibility. No perpetrator
of such an act would do that. Consider the attacks of September 11. Did the
United States have clear and convincing proof that Bin Laden was
responsible when the United States sent forces to Afghanistan? The United
States did not acquire the videotape of Osama bin Laden bragging about the
incident until weeks later. But it never would have gotten that evidence if
it had not counterattacked. Indeed, nations that follow the Oil Platforms
decision hardly ever will be able to use Article 51 to mount an immediate
counterattack when struck by terrorists.
This interpretation of Article 51 also does not square with ordinary
self-defense principles. A person acting in self-defense does not need *164
to have clear proof. Again, the Model Penal Code says that the standard is
whether the person believes that force is necessary to prevent immediate
harm. 72 Surely, the United States reasonably could and did believe that it
was necessary to strike Iran given all the provocation.
True, mistakes may happen, but the law of self-defense has never sought
to prevent all mistakes. In the criminal law context, a victim does not even
need to use force against the right person. In one criminal case, for
example, a woman thought she was about to be attacked by her brother-inlaw. She wanted to shoot him but accidentally killed her sister. Nevertheless, the court said that was still self-defense.73 Requiring individuals or
nations to wait for perfect proof of the identity of the perpetrator of an
armed attack before acting in self-defense may negate their right of
self-defense altogether.
D. The Attempt to Prohibit Self-Defense Against Non-States

71

Id.
Model Penal Co de § 3.04 (2001).
73
Bro wn v. State, 94 So. 8 74, 8 74 (Fla. 19 22).
72
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In its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 74 the International Court
of Justice attempted to impose yet another restriction on the inherent right
of self-defense preserved in Article 51. The court ruled that a nation may
act in self-defense only when attacked by another nation.75 A nation, the
court said, cannot use force to defend itself against attacks by a mere
terrorist organization.76
The opinion concerned Israel’s efforts to build a security barrier to
prevent suicide bombers and other terrorists from entering Israel from the
occupied territory of the West Bank.77 The security barrier, as planned,
would run along Israel’s borders with the West Bank. The *165 barrier also
would enter the occupied West Bank in many places, enclosing territory
that does not belong to Israel.
Opponents of the planned security barrier argued in part that it would
violate Article 2(4) because it would amount to an acquisition of territory
by force; Israel, they asserted, was taking parts of the West Bank territory
by forcibly building the security barrier.78 The U.N. General Assembly
asked the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the
legality of Israel’s plan.79 The International Court of Justice said that
building the fence was an unlawful use of force in the West Bank.80 It
rejected Israel’s argument that it was building the fence in self-defense
under Article 51.81 The court said “Article 51 of the Charter recognizes the
existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by
74

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a W all in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) [hereinafter Advisory
Opinion]. For an excellent and detailed analysis of the case , see Sean D . Murphy,
Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory O pinion: An Ip se Dixit from the ICJ?,
99 A M. J. Int’l L. 62 (2005).
75
See A dvisory Op inion, sup ra note 74, at 194 -95.
76
See id. T he Court’s opinion also might imply yet another restriction on the use
of self-defense under article 5 1: A nation can only use violent means of acting in
self-defense under article 51 and that non-violent means-like building a fence-odd ly
are not justified. See Ro bert A. Ca plen, No te, Mending the “Fence”: How
Treatment of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict by the International Court of Justice
at the Hague Has Redefined the Doctrine of Self-Defense, 57 FLA. L. REV. 717,
762 -63 (2 005 ).
77
See A dvisory Op inion, sup ra note 74, at 170 -72.
78
Id. at 171.
79
Id. at 141.
80
See id .
81
Id. at 197.
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one State against another State.”82 Israel could not rely on the article,
according to the court, because the terrorist groups attacking Israel are not
“States.”
The implications of this decision for the United States are staggering.
The United States’ foremost enemy, al-Qaeda, is not a state. Therefore,
under this decision, the United States could not respond with force to the
attacks of September 11, 2001, or to the 1998 bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Africa. On the contrary, any response would violate the U.N.
Charter.
The International Court of Justice did not overlook this consequence of
its decision. The sole dissenting member of the court, Judge Thomas
Buergenthal, not only explained that restricting the right of self-defense
was an error, he specifically called the court’s attention to how the decision
would make the United States’ military responses to al-Qaeda unlawful. 83
But the court adhered to its views.
Perhaps even more regrettably, a majority of the Security Council
appears to agree with the International Court of Justice. Immediately after
September 11, the United States prodded the Security Council to act. The
Security Council adopted a diplomatically-worded resolution, Resolution
No. 1368, condemning the attacks. 84 But the Security Council cagily
avoided saying that the United States had a right to defend itself under
Article 51.
*166 The preamble to Resolution No. 1368 declares that the Security
Council was “[r]ecognizing the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence in accordance with the Charter .”85 In other words, the
Security Council acknowledged that the U.N charter contains a right to act
in self-defense, something no one ever disputed. The Resolution, however,
did not say what the right to self-defense entails. Most particularly, it did
not say that al-Qaeda had committed an “armed attack” for the purposes or
Article 5 and it did not say that the United States had a right to act in
self-defense in response to the attack by al-Qaeda.
In contrast, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had no
difficulty seeing the attacks for what they were. On October 2, 2001,
NATO’s president issued this statement:

82

See id . at 194 .
See id ., Dec laration of Buergenthal, J., at 2 01.
84
S.C. R es. 13 68 U .N. D oc. S/RES/13 68 (Sep t. 12, 2001 ).
85
Id.
83
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The facts are clear and compelling. The information presented points
conclusively to an Al-Qaida role in the 11 September attacks.
We know
that the individuals who carried out these attacks were part of the worldwide terrorist network of Al-Qaida, headed by Osama bin Laden and his
key lieutenants and protected by the Taleban. O n t h e b a s i s o f t h is
briefing, it has now been determined that the attack against the United
States on 11 September was directed from abroad and shall therefore be
regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty [which
created NATO], which states that an armed attack on one or more of the
Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against
them all.86 Why couldn’t the Security Council issue a similarly-worded
resolution declaring that al-Qaeda had committed an “armed attack”
justifying the United States in acting in self-defense by attacking al-Qaeda?
Presumably, a majority of the Security Council-or a member having a veto
power-did not agree with this conclusion.
This fourth creative restriction on Article 51, like the other three
previously discussed, also has no legal basis. As many others have
observed, nothing in the language of Article 51 says that an armed *167
attack must be by a state.87 And principles of self-defense generally focus
on the perspective of the person or the nation threatened, not on the identity
of the perpetrator. From the perspective of the nation threatened, it does not
matter whether the perpetrator is a state actor or a non-state actor. The goal
is to provide self-protection. Indeed, diplomacy and other non-military
actions are more likely to be effective with state actors than with non-state

86

See Lord Ro bertson, Secretary General, NATO , Statement (2 October 2001),
http://www .nato.int/d ocu/speech/20 01/s0 110 02a .htm.
87
See Carsten Stahn, T errorist Acts as “Arm ed A ttack”: T he Right to
Self-defense, Article 51 (1/2) of the UN Charter, and International Terrorism, 27
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 35, 42 (Fall 2003) (arguing that “[t]he term ‘armed
attack’ was traditionally applied to states, but nothing in the Charter indicates that
‘armed attacks’ can only emanate from states.”); Fr. Robert J. Araujo, S.J.,
Implementation of the ICJ Advisory Opinion-Legal Consequences of the Construction of a W all in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Fences [Do No t] Make Good
Neighbors?, 22 B.U. Int’l L.J. 349, 383 (2004) (“The article does not specify who
must be or can b e the author of or be respo nsible fo r an attack that can trigger
application of the self-defense provision.”); Barry A. Feinstein, A Paradigm for the
Analysis of the Legality of the U se of Armed Forc e Against T errorists and States
That Aid and Abet Them, 17 TRANSNAT’L LAW . 51, 67-68 (2004 ) (“Nothing
contained in the United Nations Charter specifies that ‘an armed attack’ may only
be perpetrated by a State, and Article 51 was drafted in a bro ad en ough mann er to
perm it the use of force in self-defense to co unter no n-state actors.”).
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actors. So there may be a greater need to use military force in self-defense
against non-state-sponsored terrorists than against state-sponsored
terrorists.
V. How the United States Should Respond
The campaign to restrict the right to use force in self-defense under
Article 51 is clearly unacceptable to the United States and other nations
facing the threat of international terrorism. The four restrictions that organs
of the United Nations have attempted to impose would largely make
military responses to terrorism impossible. So what should the United
States do about them? The United States has several options, although all
of them have difficulties.
A. Ignoring the Attempts to Impose Restrictions
The first possible response is for the United States to ignore the four
restrictions that the organs of the United Nations have attempted to impose
on Article 51. This response is not difficult, not unprecedented, and not
unjustified.
The U.N. General Assembly has passed all kinds of ludicrous resolutions. These resolutions have few practical consequences and generally*168 just bring disrepute on the nations that vote for them. The United
States, for this reason, did not care, and did not need to care, when the
General Assembly condemned it for bombing Libya in 1986.88 Nothing
came of the resolution.
The Security Council’s resolutions have more force. But the United
States holds a veto power on the Security Council. The United States
therefore could veto any proposed Security Council resolution that might
condemn defensive actions that the United States might take under Article
51. The United States therefore does not need to ignore resolutions of the
Security Council.
That leaves only the International Court of Justice, and the United States
also can ignore its judgments. In fact, it already has done so. In the
Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice ordered the United States
to pay compensation to Nicaragua, but the United States refused to comply
with the judgment.89 The U.N. General Assembly subsequently passed

88
89

See G .A. Re s. 41/3 8, P 11, U .N. D oc. A /RES/41 /38 (N ov. 20, 19 86).
Nica ragua, supra note 5 1, at 40 .

THE CAMPAIGN TO RESTRICT THE RIGH T OF SELF-DEFENSE

20

several resolutions urging the United States to comply immediately, 90 but
the United States ignored these resolutions as well. As a result of this case,
the United States withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice.91
Ignoring attempts to impose restrictions on the right of self-defense has
a legal basis. The U.N. Charter is a multilateral treaty. The United States
signed this treaty, agreeing to abide by Article 51 and the other articles in
the Charter. It did not agree to abide by the creative restrictions that organs
of the United Nations have attempted to put on Article 51. The four
limitations described above have no basis in the text of Article 51, and they
run counter to generally accepted principles of self-defense. For this reason,
the United States would be less faithful to the U.N. Charter if it agreed to
follow the four restrictions than if it simply ignored them.
For these reasons, ignoring the creative restrictions that organs of the
United Nations have attempted to impose on Article 51 is something that
the United States can and should do. But ignoring the interpretations of
Article 51 is not enough. Although the United States may have the fortitude
to ignore the General Assembly, the power to veto *169 Security Council
Resolutions, and the willingness to withdraw from the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, many of the United States’
allies do not. These creative restrictions on the right to exercise selfdefense may prevent these allies from taking military action against
terrorists. In the global war against terrorism, this possibility would harm
the United States.
B. Amending the United Nations Charter
Another possible response would be for the United States to propose
amending Article 51 to make clear that the right to exercise self-defense is
not subject to the four supposed limitations described above. Some foreign
political leaders have expressed interest in this possibility.92 If the nations
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See G.A. Res. 41/31, U .N. Doc. A/RE S/41/31 (No v. 3, 2001); G.A . Res.
42/18, U.N . Doc. A/RES/42/18 (Nov. 12, 1987); G.A. Res. 44/43, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/4 3 (D ec. 7, 1 989 ).
91
See Le tter from Secretary of State Schultz to the Secretary-Gen eral of the
United N ations (O ct. 7, 19 85), reprinted in 2 4 I.L.M . 174 2 (1985 ).
92
See Tom Ruys & Sten Verhoeven, Attacks by Private Actors and the Right of
Self-defence, 10 J. CON FLICT & SEC URIT Y L. 289 , 298 (2005 ) (discussing a
proposal by the Australian Prime Minister to amend the U.N. charter to provide
explicitly that a nation has the right to attack terro rist groups in other co untries).
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of the world could agree on amendments that would accomplish this goal,
then the entire problem would disappear.
Drafting an amendment would not be difficult. For example, the United
States might propose adding a sentence at the end of Article 51 saying
something like the following:
A Member of the United Nations that has suffered an armed attack is not
inhibited from exercising its inherent right to use force in self-defense
merely because (1) the armed attack did not occur on or against the nation’s
territory; (2) the armed attack did not cause grave harm; (3) the Member
cannot prove the identity of the perpetrator with certainty; and (4) the
armed attack was not state-sponsored. This amendment would neither
expand nor contract the inherent right of self-defense that Article 51 strives
to protect. Instead, it simply would get rid of the creative limitations that
the International Court of Justice and the other organs of the United
Nations have attempted to place on the inherent right to self-defense.
Unfortunately, this proposal has a clear problem. Amending the U.N.
Charter in this manner would be politically impossible. Only the United
States and a few other democracies both use military force to respond to
terrorism and care about international law. The rest of the *170 world
either does not fight terrorism with military force or does not heed
international law. Most nations thus would see no reason to make changes
to the U.N. Charter just to benefit the United States and a few other
countries. In fact, they likely would oppose it largely because the United
States supports it.
Indeed, proposing the amendment might cause more harm than good. If
the United Nations rejected the proposal (as it almost surely would),
opponents of American policy subsequently might cite the rejection in
support of the four creative limitations discussed above. They might argue
that the rejection of the amendment shows that members of the United
Nations favor the four restrictions. Although this argument lacks legal
validity, it would not help the United States politically or diplomatically.
C. Persuading the ICJ to Change its Interpretation
The United States also might respond by attempting to persuade the
International Court of Justice to change its interpretation of Article 51.
However, this possible response also has problems. One is that the United
States generally wants to avoid litigation in the International Court of
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Justice, which it rightly considers a hostile forum.93 Another is that the
International Court of Justice seems unlikely to listen to reason on the
subject of self-defense.
In the Israeli Wall Case, as noted above, only one judge out of the total
of fifteen disagreed with the conclusion that using force was impermissible
against non-state actors.94 The dissenting judge, Thomas Buergenthal of
the United Sates, explained the problem with the majority’s position in a
simple and cogent manner.95 But the other members of the court were
unmoved. The likelihood of changing the views of the International Court
of Justice is thus very small.
*171 D. Taking Action Through the Security Council
The United States also might oppose these four restrictive interpretations of Article 51 by using its permanent seat and veto power on the
Security Council to influence the decisions of the Security Council. The
United States clearly does not have the political influence to persuade the
Security Council to authorize the use of force against terrorists; its failure
to get stronger wording in Security Council Resolution No. 1368 proves
this point.96 But there are three things that the United States can do.
First, the United States can veto any resolutions that would condemn a
nation for using self-defense based on these four principles. For example,
the United States should not have abstained from the resolution condemning Israel for bombing the PLO headquarters in Tunisia after the PLO’s
armed attack in 1985. The United States disagreed with the decision of the
Security Council and fully agreed that Israel had a right to defend itself
under Article 51, but the United States at the time worried that vetoing the
resolution would lead to anti-American riots in Tunisia.97 In retrospect, the
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Douglas J. Ende, Com ment, Reaccepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice: A Proposal for a New United States Declaration, 61
W ASH . L. REV. 114 5, 1145 (19 86) (“Perhaps the primary reason, similar to that
advanced following the United States withdrawal from the litigation brought by
Nicaragua against the United States, is the administration’s belief that the
com position of the Court is essentially hostile to United States interests.”).
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See Advisory Opinion, supra note 74, Declaration of Buergenthal, J., at 201.
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See su pra p art IV .D.
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See Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Defends Action in U.N. on Raid, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 1985, at A3 (reporting that Secretary of State George Schultz explained the
United States’ action by stating the follow ing:
Reagan and other high officials had considerable sym pathy fo r the Israeli
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abstention did not help the United States much in its relations with
Tunisia.98 In addition, the Security Council’s condemnation of Israel surely
gave credence to the General Assembly’s view that the United States was
acting unlawfully when it used military force against Libya the following
year.
Second, the United States generally can persuade other members of the
Security Council at least to condemn terrorist attacks. For example, the
Security Council condemned al-Qaeda in Resolution No. *172 1368.99
Certainly, al-Qaeda did not care about the condemnation from the United
Nations. But the condemnation may encourage nations to take stronger
steps against terrorist organizations.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the United States can use its
communications to the Security Council to shape interpretations of Article
51. As explained above, Article 51 contains a notice requirement: A nation
must provide notice when it uses force under Article 51.100 The United
States typically has done this by writing a letter to the Security Council. For
example, when the United States attacked targets in Afghanistan and Sudan
after the 1998 embassy bombings, it wrote a long letter listing al-Qaeda’s
evil misdeeds.101
action [but] there was overwhelming information suggesting that a United
States veto would unleash leftist students and other groups into the streets
in Tunisia, perh aps to destro y the Am erican Embassy and perhap s to
overthrow the Government of President Habib B ourguiba.).
98
Michael Ross, Reagan Remarks on Raid Caused Shock; U.S.-Tunisian Ties:
Irreparable Harm?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1985, at sec. 1, p. 13 (reporting that the
“abstention and subsequent statements by Reagan have helped to cool Tunisian
tempers, but officials here say they believe that the close relations that successive
U.S. administrations have had with Tunisia over the years have now come to an
end.”).
99
See S .C. Res. 13 68, supra note 84 (“T he Security Counc il [u]nequivo cally
condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on
11 September 20 01 in New Y ork, Washington, D.C . and P ennsylvania and regards
such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace
and security .”).
100
See U.N. Cha rter art. 51 (“Me asures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defence shall be immediately repo rted to the Security Counc il .”).
101
See L etter from Bill Richard son to Danilo T urk, sup ra note 2.
M y Government has obtained convincing information that the organization of
Usama Bin Laden is responsible for the devastating bombings of the United States
embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. Those attacks resulted in the deaths of 12
American nationals and over 250 other persons The Bin Ladin organization
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Letters of this kind have no binding effect by themselves. But international incidents are often judged in light of past practices. This tradition is
useful to the United States. The United States is one of the few countries
that takes military action against terrorists in foreign countries. So it is one
of the few countries that sends formal notices to the Security Council
explaining why it believes that an action in self-defense is necessary. And
because the United States has a veto power, the Security Council generally
has no way to contradict the United States by passing a contrary resolution.
Letters to the Security Council of this kind have been important already.
Even now, scholars are drawing conclusions about the meaning of Article
51 based on the Security Council’s non-reaction to the letter sent by the
United States following the attacks of September 11, *173 2001.102 The
letters also may provide legal support for the United States’ positions in
other contexts. For instance, military commissions in Guantanamo are
seeking to try members of al-Qaeda.103 Some of the accused have disputed
when al-Qaeda began or ended various conspiracies to violate the laws of
war.104 But prosecutors have been able to cite letters sent by the United
States to the Security Council under Article 51 addressing prior incidents
like the embassy bombings, thus providing evidence of the duration of the
armed conflict with al-Qaeda.105
VI. Conclusion
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter has great importance in the effort to
combat international terrorism. This article preserves the right to use
maintains an extensive network of camps in Sudan, which have been and are being
used to mo unt terro rist attacks a gainst American targets.
Id.
102
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Lega l Up dates , http://
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104
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105
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news/O ct2004/d 200 410 26m otion.pdf.
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military force in self-defense. The United States and other democratic
nations must rely on Article 51 for authority to use military force against
terrorists in foreign countries. Because the Security Council is politically
hostile, they cannot expect the Security Council to grant them the authority
to use force under any other provision of the Charter.
Unfortunately, the International Court of Justice and other organs of the
United Nations have attempted to impose four dangerous restrictions on the
right to act in self-defense under Article 51. Cumulatively they have said
that a nation may act in self-defense to an armed attack by terrorists only
if the terrorist attack (1) occurred against the nation’s territory; (2) actually
caused grave harm; (3) left sufficient evidence to allow the victim to prove
the identity of the perpetrator in court; and (4) was done by a foreign
government as opposed to a nongovernmental*174 terrorist organization
like al-Qaeda, Hamas, or Hizbollah.
These four restrictions, if followed, would have the practical effect of
prohibiting most military responses to terrorism. In addition, if they in fact
were the law, then the United States would have acted illegally in
defending itself following terrorist attacks by Libya, Iran, and al-Qaeda.
The United States and other nations that oppose terrorism cannot accept
this understanding of the U.N. Charter.
None of the four restrictions that the organs of the United Nations have
attempted to impose finds support in the language of Article 51. Indeed, the
simple language of Article 51 appears to preclude the restrictions for the
reasons explained above. The restrictions also run contrary to general
principles of the law of self-defense. They seem to transform Article 51
from a provision about acting in self-defense into a provision about evening
the score in a game between equals.
Unfortunately, the United States has limited options for opposing these
restrictive interpretations of Article 51. True, the United States generally
can ignore the General Assembly’s resolutions and can avoid the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. But realistically, the United States
cannot push through amendments to the U.N. Charter, cause the International Court of Justice to change its views, or get authorization for the use
of force from the Security Council.
Still, the United States can use its veto power to prevent the Security
Council from condemning countries that use force in self-defense. And it
can use opportunities afforded by the U.N. Charter to express its interpretation of Article 51, thus establishing helpful precedent for future disputes.
In particular, the United States can and should explain its understanding of
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Article 51 every time it tells the Security Council that it is going to use
force in self-defense.

